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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the dynamics of a very small economy which tries to
attract foreign investments. For that purpose, we model the intertemporal behav-
ior of a small jurisdiction using taxes and attractive public infrastructures as policy
instruments, for given policy choices of the rest of the world. Applying Pontrya-
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1 Introduction
Small states suffer from very limited capital and labour resources both in amount and
in variety. Their small home market size prevents them from exploiting scale and scope
economies. It is therefore not surprising that small states are highly open to interna-
tional trade and capital flows.
Because of their smallness these countries are highly depending on forces outside
their control which could threaten their economic viability (Briguglio, 1995). This ex-
plains the general view that the economic performance of these small states is asso-
ciated with vulnerability1 to external shocks. Nevertheless, the strong growth perfor-
mance of some small states suggests that it is possible to at least partially offset this
vulnerability and increase their resilience by means of appropriate endogenous poli-
cies (Armstrong and Read, 2002). Armstrong, De Kervenoael and R. Read (1998) show
that one country’s economic smallness does not necessarily have a negative effect on
its performance. This can be explained by the fact that small countries develop abilities
and use instruments to overcome their natural handicaps. For example, some of the
richest countries in the world are small states such as Luxembourg, and Iceland2 . This
is an illustration of what Briguglio et al. (2009) call the “Singapore Paradox”, which is
the situation where a country highly vulnerable to exogenous shocks still manages to
attain high economic performance.
Since domestic capital is relatively scarce in very small economies, it follows that
attracting foreign investments is an important way to fill in this gap. As a matter of fact
those economies tend to get more private capital from abroad as a ratio of total capital
formation (Streeten, 1993). Moreover, capital inflow may also be a critical contributor
to the growth and development of small states (Read, 2008).
1Economic vulnerability indices mostly depend on a high level of openness and therefore are typ-
ically associated with smallness. The Commonwealth Secretariat and the UN has developed complex
and rigorous vulnerability indices (Armstrong and Read, 2002).
2Note that high vulnerability and good economic performance are not contradictory aspects of very
small economies. Indeed, Iceland has been an example for good economic performance but has shown
great fragility in the context of the latest financial crisis.
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In this paper, we assume that the small country tries to attract foreign investments
through low taxes and/or high level of public goods, which enhance firms’ productiv-
ity. Public goods can cover a wide range of infrastructures, services and regulations
provided by the local and/or the central government are attractive to firms if they
enhance their productivity3. Accordingly, capital locates according to differentials in
offered public good levels and tax differentials.
The literature has investigated the role of jurisdictions’ size on their capacity to
attract capital. Recent papers show that small economies can be attractive not only for
tax reasons but also for their provision of public infrastructures (Justman et al., 2005,
Zissimos and Wooders, 2008, Hindriks et al., 2008, Pieretti and Zanaj, 2009).
This paper extends this literature by modelling the dynamics of a small economy’s
strategies to attract foreign investments. More precisely, we study a small state’s inter-
temporal choice of optimal taxes which are used to afford public goods which enhance
firms’ productivity. Applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle we then characterize
the potential steady states attainable by the small economy.
The dynamic interactions among jurisdictions to attract mobile factors have already
been analyzed using the framework of repeated games. The main issue studied by this
literature is the tax coordination problem between symmetric regions (Cardarella et
al., 2002, Catenaro and Vidal, 2006, Itaya et al., 2008 ). The purpose of this paper is
however not to model a game between jurisdictions. We rather focus on the strategic
choices of a very small open economy facing exogenously given choices of the rest
of the world. The world is thus divided into two unequal sized regions where size
3In this context, we may consider transportation infrastructures, universities and public R&D in-
vestment, but also property rights enforcement, capital market regulations, labor and environmental
regulations and the absence of red tape procedures. It follows that countries’ ability to attract foreign
investment may also be attractive for the quality of their institutions. In the Oxford Handbook of En-
trepreneurship (2007), it is argued that the abundance of entrepreneurs in a country depends, among
other factors, on the existence of regulations, property rights, accounting standards and disclosure re-
quirements. Furthermore, in recent years there has been a surge of country and cross-country studies
relating economic development to institutions, especially those affecting capital market development
and functionality (La Porta et al. (1997) among others).
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refers to the magnitude of the population, which coincides with the number of capital-
owners who are simultaneously entrepreneurs and workers. More basically, our paper
tries to offer an insight into the dynamic policy behavior of a very small country trying
to guarantee the long run survival of its economy. We thus analyze, in an infinite
time horizon, the dynamics of its size and its policy instruments for exogenous foreign
levels of taxes and public goods. In that context we will have to deal with complex
state space conditions.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows.
We show that there exists three types of steady states. One in which the size of
the initially small country attracts sufficiently external capital to grow as big as the
foreign economy. One in which the small economy is no more economically viable
since it looses all its productive capital. Finally an intermediate situation in which the
domestic economy survives while remaining small. In this scenario, there exists at
least one intermediate steady state which exhibits saddle point stability. If the small
economy does not undergo the optimal path which leads to one of these intermediate
equilibria it may converge to the worst case. The survival of the small economies is
thus an important public policy issue which implies an appropriate choice of initial
conditions and a dynamic update of the tax policy.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and the
optimal conditions via Pontryagin maximum principle. Section 3 provides the type
and the analysis of steady states and its convergence. Finally section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The world is composed of two regions of unequal population size4. In the rest of the
paper, we consider the smallest region as the small or the home country and the largest
as the foreign country or the rest of the world indifferently. We assume that the mem-
4Country size may be defined by its population, by its area, or by its national income (Streeten, 1993).
In our paper, we focus on the population aspect rather than on the spatial size.
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bers of both jurisdictions are at the same time entrepreneurs and workers and each of
them owns one unit of productive capital5. We thus assume that the size of a country
is equivalent to the number of firms located in its territory.
At time t = 0, these jurisdictions are represented on an interval [−S(0), S∗(0)]6.
The size of the small country is S(0) and extends from −S(0) to 0 which corresponds
to the border B. The rest of the world has a size of S∗(0) with S(0) < S∗(0) and
extends from 0 to S∗(0). The firm-owners in both jurisdictions are evenly distributed
on their respective sub-interval according to their disposition to invest outside their
home location. As in Ogura (2006), we assume that the population of investors is
heterogeneous in the degree of their attachment to home7.
In our spatial setting we assume that the closer firms are located to the extremes
the more they are attached to their current location. Conversely, the closer firms are
to the border 0, the less they are attached to their territory and the easier they are able
to relocate8 abroad. This means that a firm of type α ∈ [−S(0), 0] located in the home
country incurs a disutility of relocating abroad which equal k · x, where x = d(α, 0),
i.e. the distance between 0 and α. The coefficient k represents the unit cost of moving
capital abroad which can also be interpreted as the degree of international integration.
Now assume that each population member of both jurisdictions owns one unit of
capital which she combines with her labor to set up a firm to produce q+ ai (ai = a, a∗)
units of a final good, where q is the private component of (gross) productivity. The frac-
tion a (a∗) of the produced good depends on the public input 9 supplied by the home
5We thus implicitly assume that the endowment in human resources and physical capital grows in
proportion to the human population.
6The substrict“ * ”refers to the large (foreign) jurisdiction.
7Heterogeneity in home attachment was first considered in the fiscal competition literature by Man-
soorian and Myers (1993).
8For reasons of simplicity, we assume that relocation if any is only possible in the neighboring juris-
diction.
9The public input satisfies the local public good characteristic, which means that it is jointly used
without rivalry by firms located in the same jurisdiction. It follows that the benefits and the costs of
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(foreign) jurisdiction . The produced output is sold in a competitive (world) market
at a given price normalized to one. Assuming that both countries have equal access
to a common market implies that the homiest jurisdiction does not suffer from a re-
duced home market. We further suppose that the unit production cost is constant and
equal to zero without loss of generality. For example, the public infrastructure invest-
ment ai may be an improvement of existing regulations that potentially increase the
performance of the financial services industry. This makes, other things being equal,
the country more attractive to foreign financial firms and increases the attachment to
home of domestic financial firms.
We now adopt a temporal perspective of the above setting. Each period t ∈ [∆t,+∞) ,
(for any ∆t > 0) governments update their choice in terms of offered public goods and
taxes10. We assume that the total number of entrepreneurs, S(t)+S∗(t) will be constant
over time t and normalized to one. Since firms will move, the relative size of both ju-
risdictions will change with t. In the following we wish to focus on the behavior of a
small country. We therefore suppose that the home country’s size S(t) is small enough
to consider the rest of the world’s choices as exogenously given. We thus keep in mind
following state constraint
0 ≤ S(t) < 1
2
for t ∈ [0,+∞) . (1)
Providing firms with public infrastructures is costly. The public technology which
serves to produce each period the public input is given by the function f (S(t), T (t)) .
where T (t) ∈ [0, T̂ ] denotes the tax levied on one unit of capital at time t, and T̂ ∈ (0,∞)
is a constant. Supposing that the public good depreciates at a rate δ, we can write the
these good only accrue at the jurisdictional level. As in Zissimoss and Wooders (2008), we shall abstract
from congestion costs . Taking account of congestion would complicate our framework without im-
proving qualitatively the results. Moreover, if the public input represents immaterial goods as law and
regulations (protecting intellectual property, specifying accurate dispute resolution rules,...), the absence
of congestion is easily justified by the particular nature of these goods.
10Notice that we assume there are no sunk cost on the investment or that our unit of time t is long
enough to cancel the sunk cost of investment.
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following motion equations
a˙(t) = h [a(t)]− δa(t) + f [S(t), T (t)] , (2)
a˙∗(t) = h [a∗(t)]− δa∗(t) + f [S∗(t), T ∗(t)] , (3)
where h [...] represents the flow of public inputs produced by the use of public inputs.
For simplicity we shall work with following linear functions: h [a(t)] = ξa(t), h [a∗(t)] =
ξa∗(t), f [S(t), T (t)] = ζS(t)T (t) and f [S∗(t), T ∗(t)] = ζS∗(t)T ∗(t) where ξ is a non-
negative unit fee charged for the use of the public infrastructure and ζ represents a non-
negative productivity factor. Furthermore, we assume that these coefficients verify
0 ≤ ξ < δ which rules out a breakdown in the production of public infrastructures.
Assume now that an entrepreneur of type α(t) initially located in the small country
considers to stay at home or to invest her/his physical capital abroad. If she/he decides
not to move, her/his profit is given by11
pi(t) = q(t) + a(t)− T (t) (4)
If she invests abroad, her/his profit becomes
pi∗(t) = q(t) + a∗(t)− T ∗(t)− k · x(t)
Furthermore, consider that this capital-owner is indifferent between investing abroad
and staying at home. Then it follows that
q(t) + a(t)− T (t) = q(t) + a∗(t)− T ∗(t)− k · x(t).
After setting b∗(t) = a
∗(t)−T ∗(t)
k
, we obtain
x(t, a, a∗, T, T ∗) =
[
b∗(t)− a(t)− T (t)
k
]
. (5)
In other words, the foreign country attracts capital (x > 0) from the small jurisdiction if
the net gain of investing abroad, i.e. a∗(t)−T ∗(t), is higher than the net gain of staying
at home, a(t)− T (t), after taking into account the mobility cost.
11For sake of simplicity, we assume that q is such that the profit of each firm is positive for all equilib-
rium level of public goods and taxes.
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The motion equation of the size variable S(t) of the small economy is given by
S˙(t) = −ρx = ρ
(
a(t)− T (t)
k
− b∗(t)
)
, (6)
with the initial condition 1
2
> S(0) > 0 and positive constant ρ some kind of density
function, which does not affect the analysis and results. Remember that we assumed
that the home country is so small that it faces exogenously given levels of capital tax
T ∗(t) and public infrastructure a∗(t) chosen by the foreign country.
Note that the relocation of a subset of firms modifies at each period alters the rank-
ing of firms’ attachment to home. In the following we adopt the following rule. For all
α˜(t) ∈ [−S(t), S∗(t)], we define α˜(t) = α˜(t−∆t)+x, where α˜(t) =
{
α(t) ∈ [−S(t), O(t)]
α∗(t) ∈ [O(t), S∗(t)]
and O(t) stands for the origin at period t.
We thus assume that the preferences for the home location will change according to
the relative attractiveness of the competing jurisdictions in the following way. For the
firms which don’t move, attachment to home will increase by x if the small economy is
attractive to foreign investors (x < 0) and it will decrease if the foreign location attracts
capital from the small country (x > 0). For the capital owners who relocate abroad, the
attachment to the new location decreases with the attachment they had to the country
they left.
In the rest of the paper we focus on the small jurisdiction. We analyze, in an infinite
time horizon, the dynamics of its size S(t) and its policy instruments T (t) and a(t) for
exogenous foreign levels of taxes (T ∗) and public goods (a∗). We thus consider that the
rest of the world does not react to the small country’s decisions. We also analyze the
convergence of the variables S(t), T (t) and a(t) towards possible steady states .
We further assume that policy makers maximize the discounted12 linear-quadratic
utility, which depends on tax revenues, S(t) · T (t) net of the adjustment cost of pub-
lic inputs a2(t) with unit adjustment cost β
2
> 0. The objective-function of the small
12The time preference parameter r increases with the degree of ”impatience” of the home country’s
population.
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economy is given by
max
T (t)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
S(t)T (t)− α
2
(S(t)T (t))2 − β
2
a2(t)
]
dt, (7)
subject to the state equations (2) and (6) and the state constraint (1), where α represents
an cost parameter of collecting taxes. We assume furthermore that linear-quadratic
utility is increasing and concave in term of total tax, that is, T̂ < 1
2α2
.
We now characterize the inter-temporal optimal tax strategy chosen by the policy
makers in the small country. Applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle, we derive
a canonical system of ordinary differential equations that has to be satisfied by the
optimal trajectories. Since the Hamiltonian of the dynamic optimization problem is
concave with respect to the state variables, the Maximum principle provides not only
necessary but also sufficient optimality conditions for interior solutions (see e.g. Sethi
and Thompson [16], Hartl et al. [9], or Chiang [7] ).
Proposition 1 For any state trajectory (S(t), a(t)) that corresponds to an optimal taxation
strategy of the policy maker, there exist piecewise absolutely continuous costates µ(t), ν(t) and
two multipliers θ1(t) ≥ 0, θ2(t) ≥ 0, such that the optimal choice variable T (t) satisfies
T (t)S2(t) =
(1 + ζν)S − ρ
k
(µ− θ1 + θ2)
α2
. (8)
In addition to (6) and (2) the costate equations become
µ˙ = rµ− ζTν − (1− αTS)T, (9)
ν˙ = (r + δ − ξ)ν + βa− ρ
k
(µ− θ1 + θ2). (10)
We further have
S˙ = −ρ
(
b∗ − a− T
k
)
≤ 0, if S(t) = 1
2
; θ1(t)
(
1
2
− S(t)
)
= 0, θ1 ≥ 0, (11)
S˙ = −ρ
(
b∗ − a− T
k
)
≥ 0, if S(t) = 0; θ2(t)S = 0, θ2 ≥ 0. (12)
Finally, the transversality conditions lim
t→∞
e−rtµS = 0 and lim
t→∞
e−rtνa = 0 are satisfied.
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In the following section, we characterize the potential steady states of the system
and we analyze how the steady states can be attained.
3 Steady states and convergence analysis
Steady states are defined as rest points of the dynamic equations (2), (6), (9) and (10)
with assumption that in the long run a∗ and T ∗ are constants. Due to the state space
constraints, there are two types of possible steady states: two constraint steady states
and unconstraint steady state(s). The constraint steady states can be the upper bound,
S = 1
2
, of the small’s country population or its lower bound S = 0.
We first study the interior steady states Ŝ (0 < Ŝ < 1
2
) where the boundary con-
straints are both not binding. Hence, θ̂1 = 0 and θ̂2 = 0 and the interior rest points of
the dynamic system (6), (2), (9) and (10) are specified in the following proposition 13.
Proposition 2 For any given parameters ρ, δ, ξ(< δ), ζ , k, and for any foreign policy choices,
a∗ and T ∗, made by the rest of the world , there is always one steady state14
â =
ζ(r + δ − ξ)
α(r + δ − ξ)(δ − ξ) + βζ2 (> 0), Ŝ =
(δ − ξ)â
ζT̂
, T̂ = â− (a∗ − T ∗) (13)
and the two costate variables are
µ̂ = 0, ν̂ = − βâ
(r + δ − ξ)(< 0). (14)
This steady state is a saddle point of the canonical system (2), (6), (9) and (10). Moreover,
it is one dimensional locally asymptotically stable, if 15r >
ρT̂
kŜ
. Otherwise, if r <
ρT̂
kŜ
, it is
two dimensional locally asymptotically stable.
13The proof is given in the appendix
14In addition to the above interior steady state, other interior solutions may appear for special param-
eter and coefficient combinations. We present these cases in the appendix.
15The values of T̂ and Ŝ are given in (13).
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First note that according to (13) it is optimal for the small state to equate the net (of
taxes) amount of provided public goods â− T̂ to that of the foreign economy ( a∗−T ∗).
It also appears in (13) that the amount of public infrastructure offered in the steady
state does not depend on the rest of the world’s decision variables. This is not the case
for the equilibrium tax rate16 T̂ and consequently for the equilibrium size Ŝ .
If the policy variables set by the rest of the world change, the budget condition
in the small open economy always holds. This follows from the fact that we always
have (δ − ξ)â = ζŜT̂ since a˙ = 0. This implies that the tax revenue ŜT̂ = (δ−ξ)â
ζ
is independent of the foreign decision variables. It follows that the costate variable
corresponding to S is zero in the steady state, µ̂ = 0. Furthermore, the negative value
of ν̂ implies that increasing the public goods provision decreases the social welfare,
due to the presence of adjustment costs in the objective function of the policy maker.
We see that the steady state provision of public goods increases with the time pref-
erence r since ∂â
∂r
> 0.The reason is that the more the home country is impatient the
more it will be reluctant to postpone to invest in public infrastructures.
The impact of an increase of the productivity in providing public goods is however
ambiguous. Indeed, according to (13) we have ∂â
∂ζ
> 0 if ζ < ζ (ζ =
√
α(δ−ξ)(r+δ−ξ)
β
) and
∂â
∂ζ
< 0 if ζ > ζ . In other words, if productivity increases but remains at a low level (
ζ < ζ), the home country has an incentive to increase its attractiveness by augmenting
public infrastructures. If the threshold ζ is exceeded, then an increase in productivity
induces too much public investment for a given level of taxes. Consequently, the home
country increases its attractiveness to foreign investment by reducing its tax rate17 and
thus by reducing the provision of public goods.
Next we analyze the impact of a change in â originating, for example, from a shock
affecting ζ or r on the steady state size of the home economy. It is straightforward to
show that ∂Ŝ
∂â
has the opposite sign18 of a∗−T ∗. Since condition T̂ = â− (a∗−T ∗) must
16According to (13) we could have chosen to express T̂ (or Ŝ )as an independent solution of the
foreign decision instruments. In this case â and Ŝ (or â and T̂ ) would depend on a∗and T ∗.
17Since T̂ = â− (a∗ − T ∗), and thus ∂̂a∂ζ and ∂T̂∂ζ are equal.
18 ∂Ŝ
∂â = − 1ζ (δ−ξ)(â+T∗−a∗)2 (a∗ − T ∗)
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hold in the steady state, both regions are equally attractive if the net amount of public
goods offered by the small and large economies are either positive (a∗ > T ∗and â > T̂ ).
Conversely, both regions are equally unattractive if T ∗ > a∗and T̂ > â. The derivative
∂Ŝ
∂â
is negative in the first case and positive in the second case. The impact of â on Ŝ
can now be interpreted in the following way. If both regions are equally attractive,
entrepreneurs have (for given moving costs) a preference for the counry which levies
lower taxes. If the small country increases the provision of public goods, it has also to
increase its tax rate according to the above steady state condition. It follows that capital
flows out of the small country and the size Ŝ shrinks consequently. If both regions are
equally unattractive, entrepreneurs have (for given moving costs) a preference for the
region which offers comparatively more public goods. Hence, an increase in â results
in a capital inflow into the small economy and the size Ŝ expands consequently.
As it follows from the above proposition, if the trajectory of the small economy is
not on its convergent path(s), it may go to one of the two possible corner steady states:
the lower bound S = 0 or the upper bound S = 1
2
.
Let us first consider the case where the small economy could suffer from a possible
economic collapse (S(t) = 0). In this case, the constraint on the state variable must be
binding in order to exclude a negative population value and the steady state values of
θ1 = 0 and θ2 has to be positive. Hence, the condition 12, in Proposition 1, should hold.
Furthermore, once S(t) has attained the lower bound it can no more decrease and it
should be either constant or increasing, that is, S˙(t) ≥ 0, as it is shown in Proposition
(1). In this case, we get
S = 0, θ1 = 0, a = 0, T = T
∗ − a∗, ν = 0, µ = α1
r
(T ∗ − a∗), θ2 = −µ. (15)
Hence, the following result is straightforward.
Proposition 3 For given parameters ρ, δ, ξ(< δ), ζ , k, and for any policy variables set by the
rest of the rest of the world a∗ and T ∗, if T ∗ < a∗, the small state may heading towards an
economic collapse (S = 0)19 which is specified by (15). In this case, the multiplier θ2 is strictly
19In proposition 2 we precise that this steady state is a saddle point.
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positive.
It follows that a necessary condition for the appearance of the small state’s collapse
is that the net benefit to investors is positive in the rest of the world (a∗ − T ∗ > 0).
In that case, the small country is unable to tax 20 and therefore unable to offer public
goods (a = 0).
Let us now consider the case in which the home country could converge to the
upper bound S(t) = 1
2
. Note that the attainment of such a limit requires us to abandon
the small country assumption which implies passivity of the rest of the world with
regard to the home country’s policy choices. We however explore that case and show
its possible economic relevance without modifying the small country assumption.
If S(t) = 1
2
, the constraint on the state variable becomes binding and the steady
state value of θ1 has to be positive and θ2 = 0. Hence, the condition 11, in Proposition
1, should hold. That states whenever S(t) = 1
2
, population can not increase any more,
and therefore, the change of population should be constant or decreasing: S˙(t) ≤ 0. In
the appendix, we show how the following steady state values are obtained
S =
1
2
, a =
ζ(a∗ − T ∗)
2(ξ − δ) + ζ , T = a− (a
∗ − T ∗). (16)
Moreover, the costate variables become
ν =
1
r + δ − ξ − ζ
2
(
α1
2
− α2T
4
− βa
)
, (17)
µ =
T
r
(
α1 − α2T
2
+ ζν
)
, (18)
θ1 =
(
1− 2kr
ρT
)
µ > 0, (19)
θ2 = 0. (20)
The above analysis lead to the following conclusion.
20T = T ∗ − a∗
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Proposition 4 For given parameters ρ, δ, ξ(< δ), ζ , k, and for any policy variables set by the
rest of the world a∗ and T ∗, if (a) ξ < δ < ξ + ζ
2
and a∗ > T ∗, or (b) δ > ξ + ζ
2
and a∗ < T ∗,
the economy may converge to its upper-limit size, given by (16). In this case, the multiplier θ1
is given by (19) and is strictly positive with µ and ν given respectively by (18) and (17).
According to the above condition, it appears that the small economy can converge
to its limit-size S = 1
2
only if it offers the same net benefit to foreign investors as in the
rest of the world (a− T = a∗ − T ∗). When a∗ − T ∗ > 0 (case a)), the home country may
converge to the upper bound value S = 1
2
if its productivity in providing infrastruc-
tures, ζ , is high enough (ζ > 2(δ − ξ) > 0). It follows that the home country’s size may
move to 1
2
by equating a− T to a∗ − T ∗, without being hindered by the large economy.
If the net benefit to investors offered by the large economy is negative (a∗ − T ∗ <
0)(case b)), the initially small country could end up in the situation in which it at-
tracts all the world’s capital. This does however not occur if δ > ξ + ζ
2
(see case (b) of
Proposition 4)21. In other words, the home country’s size may converge to S = 1
2
, if
a∗ − T ∗ < 0 under the condition that the productivity factor ζ is bounded from above
by 2(δ−ξ) > 0. It is however not realistic to assume that the large economy will remain
passive and will not try to restore its attractiveness by reversing the sign of a∗−T ∗. We
therefore conclude that case (a) which has some economic relevance.
4 Conclusion
Many authors recognize that small countries dramatically lack (quantitatively and
qualitatively) fundamental productive resources. These deficiencies appear especially
in the form of limited productive capital, entrepreneurs and human capital. For sim-
plicity, we merged these three types of production factors in one entity by assuming
that capital owners, firm owners and workers are the same individuals bearing differ-
ent mobility preferences.
21If the depreciation rate and the user fee of public infrastructure are equal to zero (δ = ξ = 0), the
small country will never be able to attract all the world’s capital.
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The particular situation we just featured contains a potential risk of collapse in the
small economy. One way to escape this danger is to set up public policy strategies
aimed at attracting foreign investments. These policies can be realized through dif-
ferent channels. The instruments which decision-makers are supposed to use in our
paper, are tax instruments and the provision of public infrastructures enhancing pri-
vate producers’ productivity. We focused on the strategic choices available to a small
economy given the policy choices of the rest of the world. In other words, we did not
model a game in which the large economy would react to the small country’s decisions.
This assumption was justified by the fact that the home jurisdiction is supposed to be
so small that it does induce any reaction from the large country. This assumption risks
to become fragile if the initially small country is able to continually attract firms (and
workers) from abroad. Such a possible occurrence lead us to be careful in the inter-
pretation of the model’s steady states. More precisely, we had to exclude cases which
otherwise would have contradicted the small country assumption. In a future work,
however, our framework should be able to model a non cooperative game between the
small and the both jurisdictions. Accordingly, it would be of a great interest to show
how the new modelling would change the likely occurrence of the small country’s eco-
nomic collapse.
Using an inter-temporal framework we characterize in our model the optimal strate-
gic taxation path chosen by the policy makers in the small country. Applying dynamic
optimization techniques, we derive a set of steady states and their stability conditions.
One of three types of steady states may emerge. A first one in which the size of the
initially small country attracts sufficiently external capital to grow as big as the foreign
economy. A second equilibrium in which the small economy is no more economically
viable because it looses all its productive capital. Finally, there may occur an interme-
diate situation in which the domestic economy survives while remaining small. In this
scenario, there exists at least one intermediate steady state which exhibits saddle point
stability. If the small economy does not undergo the optimal path leading to one of
these intermediate equilibria it may converge to the worst case. The survival of a small
economy is thus an important public policy issue which implies an appropriate choice
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of initial conditions and a dynamic update of the tax policy.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Define the current value of the Hamiltonian corresponding to the underling economy
H(T, S, a, µ, ν) =
[
α1ST − α2
2
(ST )2 − βa
2
2
]
−µρ
(
b∗(t)− a(t)− T (t)
k
)
+ν [(ξ − δ)a(t) + ζST ]
and the following Lagrangian which accounts for the state constraints22 of the model
L(T, S, a, µ, ν, θ1, θ2) = H(T, S, a, µ, ν)+θ1ρ
(
b∗(t)− a(t)− T (t)
k
)
−θ2ρ
(
b∗(t)− a(t)− T (t)
k
)
.
It is easy to see that H(T, S, a, µ, ν) is concave with respect to the state variables S
and a. Hence the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for the existence
of an optimum. Deriving the first order conditions from the Hamiltonian we obtain
(8) with respect to T , while we get (9) and (10) with respect to both state variables.
The multipliers of the state boundary constraints check (11) and (12). That finishes the
proof. ¤
Proof of Proposition 2
We first state the existence of possible interior steady state(s) in addition to that given
in Proposition 2. Then we give the proof .
Proposition 5 The following additional steady state(s) may appear.
22See, for example, Chiang, page 301-302.
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(II.1) If a∗ − T ∗ = −kr(δ−ξ)
4ζρ
(< 0), there is a further interior steady state specified by
T̂1 =
kr(δ − ξ)
2ζρ
, â1 = (a
∗ − T ∗) + T̂1, Ŝ1 = ρT̂1
kr
(21)
and two costate variables 23
ν̂1 =
α2Ŝ1
2
T̂1 + βâ1 − α1Ŝ1
ζŜ1 − r − δ + ξ
, µ̂1 =
k[(r + δ − ξ)ν̂1] + βâ1
ρ
. (22)
(II.2) If a∗ − T ∗ = 0, the additional steady state is
T̂2 =
kr(δ − ξ)
ζρ
(23)
and we obtain the remaining steady state variables by replacing the subscript 1 by 2 in (21) and
(22).
(II.3) If a∗ − T ∗ > 0, the second steady state is specified by
T̂3 =
kr
2ζρ
[
(δ − ξ) +
√
(δ − ξ)2 + 4ζρ
kr
(δ − ξ)(a∗ − T ∗)
]
(24)
and the others are the same as in (21) and (22) by replacing the subscript 1 to 3.
(II.4) If −kr(δ−ξ)
4ζρ
< a∗ − T ∗ < 0, there are another two interior steady states where
T̂4,5 =
kr
2ζρ
[
(δ − ξ)±
√
(δ − ξ)2 + 4ζρ
kr
(δ − ξ)(a∗ − T ∗)
]
(25)
and the remaining the others are the same as in (21) and (22) by replacing the subscript 1 by 4
and 5.
Proof.
23The condition ζŜ1 − r − δ + ξ 6= 0 must hold.
17
At the interior steady state, θ1 = 0, θ2 = 0 and we can rewrite the first order condi-
tion as follows 
T =
α1S − ρµk + ζSν
α2S2
S˙ = −ρ(b∗ − a−T
k
),
a˙ = (ξ − δ)a+ ζ S T,
µ˙ = rµ− ζTν − (α1 − α2ST )T,
ν˙ = (r + δ − ξ)ν + βa− ρ
k
µ.
(26)
We rewrite the first equation as follows
ρµ
kS
= α1 + ζν − αST. (27)
Substituting (27) into the 3rd equation and arranging leads to the
µ˙ = rµ− ρTµ
kS
.
Hence, µ˙ = 0 leads to two cases: µ̂ = 0 or r = ρT̂
kŜ
.
We consequently have two groups of steady states.
(I) µ̂ = 0.
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It is easy to check that the interior steady states are given by (13) and (14). To
determine their stability, we consider the corresponding Jacobian
JI =

ρ
kα2
α1 + ζν̂
Ŝ2
ρ
k
ρ2
α2k2Ŝ2
− ρζ
α2kŜ
0 ξ − δ − ζρ
α2kŜ
ζ2
α2
0 0 − ρ
kα2
α1 + ζν̂
Ŝ2
+ r 0
0 β −ρ
k
r + δ − ξ

=

ρT̂
kŜ
ρ
k
ρ2
α2k2Ŝ2
− ρζ
α2kŜ
0 ξ − δ − ζρ
α2kŜ
ζ2
α2
0 0 −ρT̂
kŜ
+ r 0
0 β −ρ
k
r + δ − ξ

.
It is easy to show that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian are given by
e1 =
ρT̂
kŜ
> 0, e2 = r − ρT̂
kŜ
> 0 ( or < 0),
e3,4 =
r
2
± 1
2
√
r2 + 4
[
βζ2
α2
+ (r + δ − ξ)(δ − ξ)
]
.
Hence, e3 > 0 and e4 < 0, which guarantees one dimensional convergence to the steady
state. The other part of the convergence depends on e2 is negative or not, that is, the
relation of r with respect to the other parameters and exogenous variables.
(II) r = ρT̂
kŜ
.
In this case, we have S = ρT
kr
. S˙ = 0 leads to a = (a∗ − T ∗) + T and a˙ = 0 gives
ζST = (δ − ξ)a. Combining these conditions, we obtain
ζρ
kr
T 2 − (δ − ξ)T − (δ − ξ)(a∗ − T ∗) = 0,
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which yields to two roots
T =
kr
2ζρ
[
(δ − ξ)±
√
(δ − ξ)2 + 4ζρ
kr
(δ − ξ)(a∗ − T ∗)
]
and if Λ = (δ − ξ)2 + 4ζρ
kr
(δ − ξ)(a∗ − T ∗) > 0, both roots are real. Furthermore, depend-
ing on Λ is larger or smaller than (δ − ξ)2, we have different conditions which leads to
positive T s and which serve as the other steady states. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4
In the upper-corner solution case, S = 1
2
and ,hence, θ2 = 0 and θ1 > 0. According
to the complementary slackness conditions, we must have a − T = a∗ − T ∗, that is,
T = a− (a∗ − T ∗).
From a˙ = 0, we obtain
a =
ζ
2
(a∗ − T ∗)
ξ + ζ
2
− δ . (28)
The solution a is be positive if and only if δ > ξ + ζ
2
and a∗ < T ∗, or (ξ <)δ < ξ + ζ
2
and
a∗ > T ∗ .
The condition µ˙ = 0 leads to
rµ =
T
2
ρ
k
(
µ− θ1
)
(29)
or
θ1 =
(
2kr
ρT
− 1
)
µ. (30)
Similarly, ν˙ = 0 leads to
(r + δ − ξ)ν = ρ
k
(µ− θ1)− βa. (31)
On the other hand, (8) can be rewritten as
α2S T = α1 − ρ
k
µ− θ1
S
+ ζν (32)
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which gives
−ρ
k
(µ− θ1) = α2T
4
− α1
2
− ζν
2
.
Combining with (31), it follows
ν =
1
r + δ − ξ − ζ
2
[
α1
2
− βa− α2T
4
]
(33)
and
µ =
T
r
(
α1 + ζν − α2T
2
)
. (34)
Hence, we obtain a complete solution for the steady state S = 1
2
. The above solu-
tions are meaningful if and only if θ1 > 0. ¤
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